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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
the DIVISION OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, Jean A. Williams,
Director,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 19836

vs.
GAF CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff-appellant State of Utah, Division of Consumer
Protection, alleged in its complaint that defendant-respondent
GAF Corporation violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act,
Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-4 (Supp. 1983), by declining to
replace an asphalt shingle roof pursuant to alleged
representations by a roofing contractor that the roof was so
guaranteed.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court granted GAF's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the roofing contractor was not an agent
of GAF, that GAF had never made any representations that could
be construed as deceptive acts, and that the written guarantee
given by GAF governed the consumer's claims (R. 51-52).

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent GAF Corporation seeks an affirmation of the
Court's ruling in all respects.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the facts in this case are simple and
uncontroverted, the appellant's statement of them could lead to
misimpressions at important points. Respondent GAF Corporation
will restate the facts briefly.
In June 1974, Dr. Dewey MacKay, a resident of Bountiful,
Utah, installed a new roof on his home.
C. MacKay at 4 (hereinafter

l!

Depo")).

(Deposition of Dewey

It was installed "under

the direction of Pendleton Builders," who subcontracted the job
to a roofing contractor (Id.).
Dr. MacKay was "a neighbor . . . and long-time friend" of
Ken Pendleton, the founder of Pendleton Builders (Depo at 5).
Dr. MacKay testified in his deposition that Mr. Pendleton
showed him or discussed with him several varieties of
shingles--aluminum, hand-stripped or hand-shake cedar and
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regular cedar. Mr. Pendleton, however, said that "the asphalt
shingle would be just as good a roof and would be less
expensive11 (Depo. at 6).
Dr. MacKay selected defendant GAF's Timberline shingles.
This type of shingle is covered by a written, limited warranty,
with a "25 year bond11 (Asphalt Shingle Warranty, R. 33).
Dr. MacKay does not recall whether or not he was furnished with
a copy of this warranty by Pendleton, but the record indicates
that appropriate steps were taken to preserve the coverage of
the warranty after the job was completed (R. 33, 34, 35).
In its complaint at Paragraph 10 the State alleges that
Pendleton Builders was a !fGAF Corporation dealer11 (R. 3 ) .
However, no evidence in the record supports this allegation.
When in 1981 Dr. MacKay had trouble with his roof, Mr.
Pendleton advised him to contact GAF Corporation.

Dr. MacKay

then contacted a lfdealer in Salt Lake . . . who handled their
materials.n

That dealer referred Dr. MacKay to Mr.Fanter, a

GAF representative (Depo. at 11).

In spite of the State's

allegations, Dr. MacKay never identifies Mr. Pendleton as a GAF
dealer, even though he knows what a dealer is. Dr. MacKay also
states that Pendleton Builders or its subcontractor must have
bought the shingles from Harrington Company, the dealer that is
identified (Depo. at 12).
The roof apparently gave Dr. MacKay no substantial trouble
until 1981 (Complaint at H 11, R. 3 ) . Dr. MacKayfs concerns
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about his roof had to do primarily with its appearance (Depo.
at 10).

The complaint alleges that there were no leaks (R. 4 ) ,

but Dr. MacKay testified that he was concerned about the paint
pealing off the ceiling in certain areas of his house (Depo. at
10).
In the summer of 1981, when Dr. MacKay first made
complaints

directed to GAF (R. 12), Mr. Don Fanter, GAF's

representative, took some samples from the roof and, according
to Dr. MacKay, reported that they did not comply with
specifications for Timberline shingles (Depo. at 12-13).
Dr. MacKay testified that GAF offered to compensate him under
its written warranty, but he deemed the sum offered to be
insufficient.
Dr. MacKay testified that the roof cost him $2,400 to
$2,500 when it was installed in 1974 (Depo. at 27). Dr. MacKay
was unhappy when he learned that the written warranty covering
the Timberline shingles would not cover the entire cost of
replacing his roof (R. 26-27).

He claims to have been given an

oral warranty or heard representations by Mr. Pendleton, or
perhaps the subcontractor Mr. Pendleton hired, that was
substantially more favorable to him (Id.).

He could not state

the terms of this oral warranty except to say that Mr.
Pendleton and perhaps the roofing subcontractor had said that
he was getting GAF's best, top-of-the-line shingles and that
the roof was guaranteed to last 25 years (Depo. at 22-23).
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In

its complaint the State alleges that Pendleton Builders
represented to Dr. MacKay that GAF's Timberline shingles were
n

GAF Corporation's top-of-the-line self-sealing shingle, . . .

guaranteed for 25 years11 (Complaint at 1T 10, R. 4 ) .
The fact is, as far as the record shows, that the
Timberline shingles are GAF's top-of-the-line shingles, are
made of the highest quality asphalt, and are covered by a
limited warranty that provides some compensation for defects
for a period of 25 years (R. 33).
It is the limitations of this warranty that have apparently
upset Dr. MacKay.

He thought that if anything went wrong

before 1999 he should be furnished an entire new roof, if
necessary (Depo. at 8).

When GAF did not agree with this

position, he contacted the Division of Consumer Protection of
the State of Utah and complained.

The complaint in this action

ensued.
The complaint comprises two causes of action.

The first is

based on the allegation that GAF, apparently through Pendleton
Builders, made representations to Dr. MacKay that the
Timberline shingle was a

fl

top-of-the-line, self-sealing

shingle, of the highest quality asphalt, and guaranteed for 25
years" (Complaint at 11 10, R. 4 ) , but that in fact, "at the
time the shingles were purchased and installed, they were of an
inferior quality and defective such that they would not
self-seal, but instead curled after seven years and one month"
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(Complaint at 1T 19, R. 4 ) . This, the State alleges, is a
deceptive act or practice forbidden by section 4 of the
Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The second cause of action is difficult to understand.

It

seems to be based on the notion that because Pendleton Builders
allegedly represented to Dr. MacKay that he had a warranty that
was broader than the written warranty, and GAF, upon being
contacted by Dr. MacKay, stood on its written warranty, GAF had
committed a deceptive act, even though GAF had never heard of
Mr. Pendleton's alleged representations until Dr. MacKay made
his complaint to them.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THIS ACTION
WAS NOT PROPERLY BROUGHT UNDER THE CONSUMERS
SALES PRACTICES ACT.
In its opinion the District Court wrote:
Under the facts of this case the plaintiff as the
enforcing authority has no statutory authority to
maintain an action to recover damages on behalf
of Dr. MacKay because under Sec. 13-11-17(1) it
can bring an action to recover, for each
violation, actual damages on behalf of consumers
who complain to have "within reasonable time
after it instituted proceedings under11 the
chapter of relating to consumers sales
practices. It is apparent from the complaint
that the only act complained of was the alleged
misrepresentations by Pendleton to Dr. MacKay.
Dr. MacKayfs complaint did not occur after
plaintiff had instituted any proceedings under
the act as authorized by (1)(a) and (b) of
13-11-17, and plaintiff's only basis that
defendant engaged in a deceptive practice related
to the June, 1974, purchase of shingles by
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Dr. MacKay from Pendleton. Dr. MacKay could have
instituted his own action against defendant for
the damages the plaintiff herein seeks to recover
for him. The statute does not authorize the
defendant to play such a role (R. 52).
The District Court thus dealt with the question that
immediately comes to mind upon reading the State's Complaint:
why is the State, rather than Dr. MacKay, the plaintiff in this
action?

It ruled correctly that the enforcement provisions of

the Consumer Sales Practices Act were not meant to provide
public attorneys for private citizens with private causes of
action.
Although it is not mentioned explicitly in the District
Court's written opinion, the State's attempts to construct a
"deceptive act or practice" fall remarkably short of the
standards dictated by common knowledge and common sense. In
the First Cause of Action the State asserts that "Defendant
indicated to Dr. MacKay that its Slate Blend Timberline shingle
was a top-of-the-line, high quality, self-sealing shingle with
a product life of at least 25 years.11 The State then alleges
that lfat the time the shingles were purchased and installed,
they were of an inferior quality and defective such that they
would not self-seal. . . ." (Complaint at IT 19, R. 4 ) . This,
the State concludes (Complaint at 11 20, R. 4) was a violation
of § 13-11-4(2)(b), Utah Code Ann., which provides:
(2) [T]he following acts on practices of a
supplier or the following indications by a
supplier are deceptive:
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(b) That the subject of a consumer
transaction is of a particular standard,
quality, grade, style, or model, if it is
not.
The State alleges that GAF "indicated that its shingles were of
a particular standard, quality or grade when they were not"
(Complaint at 5T 20, R. 4 ) . This, the record shows, is plainly
wrong.

Aside from the fact GAF made no such "indication,11 the

shingles provided were Timberline shingles.

Timberline

shingles are of the grade, quality or standard represented for
them.

For reasons that the record does not indicate, the

particular singles provided were defective and not of
Timberline shingle quality.
The State's allegation that such circumstances amount to a
deceptive act or indication implies that whenever a particular
grade or category of product is sold, there goes with the sale
the additional representation that the product never falls
below the standards of that grade or category, i.e., that the
product is never defective.
The State obviously does not allege that such a
representation was made or even implied, but without it, no
deceptive act or practice is alleged in the First Cause of
Action.

As the District Court stated, Dr. MacKay could have

filed an action in his own name based on some theory that would
attempt to avoid the written warranty that governs this case.
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The State's Second Cause of Action, paragraphs 22 through
24 of its complaint, comes no closer to alleging a deceptive
act.

The "deceptive act11 is based on GAF's position that its

written warranty is valid in the face of "Dr. MacKay's claim .
. . based upon an express warranty on affirmation of fact or
promise which has not been disclaimed or limited" (Complaint at
IT 23, R. 5 ) . This purported "express warranty" apparently
arose out of Dr. MacKay's conversation with his friend and
neighbor Ken Pendleton.
explained.

Its scope and substance is never

Ken Pendleton had no authority from GAF to expand

or modify its warranties (Waddell Affidavit, R. 19-20).

Before

July 1981, GAF had no knowledge of any purported representation
or affirmation made by Pendleton Builders (Id.).

In these

circumstances, GAF did not indicate that the transaction
involves or does not involve a warranty, a
disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty
terms, or other rights, remedies or obligations
if the indication is false.
Section 13-11-4(2)(j) U.C.A. (1983 Supp.)
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
PENDLETON BUILDERS HAD NO AUTHORITY, REAL OR
APPARENT, TO ENLARGE OR OTHERWISE CHANGE GAFfS
WRITTEN WARRANTY.
The State's complaint against GAF is premised on the wholly
unsupportable notion that Pendleton Builders or the subcontractor Pendleton Builders selected to install the asphalt
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shingles was GAF's agent for purposes of warranting the
shingles.
1.

The record shows:

Mr. Ken Pendleton was Dr. MacKayfs long-time neighbor

and friend (Depo. at 5 ) .
2.

Pendleton Builders were general building contractors,

and this was known to Dr. MacKay (Id.).
3.

Mr. Pendleton discussed a variety of shingles with

Dr. MacKay (Depo. at 6 ) .
4.

Dr. MacKayfs impression that he had received a general

warranty that his roof would be replaced if the shingles failed
within 25 years was based entirely on the fact that
Mr. Pendleton and perhaps the subcontractor had talked about a
"25 year11 roof, that the shingles were "top-of-the-line," and
similar statements about the shingles (Depo. at 6, 22-23,
26-27).
5.

It is fairly inferrable, and any other inference is

highly improbable, that Dr. MacKay knew that Pendleton Builders
was not a "dealer" for GAF, and was supplying the GAF shingles
for its own benefit (Depo. at 5, 11-12).
6.

Lawrence A. Waddell, GAF's district sales manager,

states in his affidavit:
. . . In 1974 . . . the only warranty provided
by GAF for Timberline shineles was the written
1
Asphalt Shingle Warranty.
A true and correct
copy of this warranty is attached to the
Memorandum in Support of the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment as Exhibit A [R. 33].
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. . . Pendleton Builders of Salt Lake City,
Utah has never been an authorized representative
or agent of GAF and has never had any authority
from GAF to extend oral warranties or
representations with respect to GAF products.
. . • Before July, 1981, GAF had no knowledge
of any representation or affirmation of fact made
by Pendleton Builders in connection with the
alleged sale and installation of MacKay's roof in
1974" (R. 18-20).
The State claims that Mr. Pendleton, or Pendleton Builders,
and perhaps the subcontractor had apparent authority to bind
GAF to the warranty Dr. MacKay is asserting.

The law of

apparent authority is neatly stated in City Electric v. Dean
Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983):
It is well settled law that the apparent or
ostensible authority of an agent can be inferred
only from the acts and conduct of the principal.
Bank of Salt Lake y. Corporation of Pres. of Ch.,
etc., Utah, 534 P.2d 887 (1975). Where corporate
liability is sought for acts of its agent under
apparent authority, liability is premised upon
the corporation's knowledge of an acquiescence in
the conduct of its agent which has led third
parties to rely upon the agent's actions.
Kiniski v. Archway Motel, Inc., Wash. App., 21
Wash. App. 555, 586 P.2d 502 (1978); Restatement,
Agency 2d § 43. Nor is the authority of the
agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to
the person with whom he deals• Id. It is the
principal who must cause third parties to believe
that the agent is clothed with apparent
authority. Kuehn v. Kuehn, Colo. App. 642 P.2d
524 (1981), reh. den. (1982). Cf. Forsyth v.
Pendleton, Utah, 617 P.2d 358 (1980). . . . It
follows that one who deals exclusively with an
agent has the responsibility to ascertain that
agent's authority despite the agent's
representations. Bradshaw v. McBride, Utah, 649
P.2d 74 (1982).
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The apparent authority the State wishes to impute to Mr.
Pendleton or the subcontractor fails to meet even one of these
tests.

The State argues that a manufacturer's mere

promulgation of sales and promotional literature for use by the
general public will, when the literature is used by a
construction contractor as part of his efforts to obtain a job,
clothe that contractor with authority to bind the manufacturer
to warranties substantially broader than the written warranty
the manufacturer otherwise gives. The law, however, requires
knowledge by and acquiescence in the acts as representations of
the purported agent. GAF knew nothing of Pendleton's purported
representations until seven years after they were supposed to
have been made.
Comment C to § 8 Restatement Agency Second states:
c. Belief by third person. Apparent
authority exists only to the extent that it is
reasonable for the third person dealing with the
agent to believe that the agent is authorized.
Further, the third person must believe the agent
to be authorized.
It should be held as a matter of law that it was unreasonable
for Dr. MacKay to believe that Mr. Pendleton was an agent of
GAF's.

Pendleton Builders was obviously acting for its own

benefit and profit, was not an exclusive dealer of GAF
shingles, and was a construction contractor, not a
manufacturer's representative or employee.
The State does not read accurately any of the cases it
cites in support of the proposition that Mr. Pendleton had
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power to bind GAF.

It claims that Cooper Paintings & Coating,

Inc. v, SCM Corporation, 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457 S.W.2d 864
(1970), involved a similar factual situation.

In that case the

Tennessee Court held where a Mr. Tippitt, an employee of the
exclusive distributor for the defendant in the State of
Tennessee, called on the architect for a building project, who,
at his insistence, issued addendums to plans and specifications
to permit the use of defendant's materials, and where the same
employee furnished the plaintiff contractor with technical
manuals written by the defendant and met with the contractor to
discuss the roofs in question, and where the materials were
shipped directly to the job site by defendant, then there was a
basis for submitting the question of the agency relationship to
a jury (457 S.W.2d 866-67).
The distinction between the instant case and Cooper
Paintings is clear.

Here the purported agent was a general

contractor with no apparent connection with the manufacturer,
there the agent was an exclusive dealer and distributor.

The

literature in question here apparently involved only general
promotional brochures; in Cooper Paintings it involved
technical manuals. Here the product was merely sold to a
customer; there its technical merits and competitive advantages
were sold to both an architect and a contractor by an exclusive
representative who was selling only this product and no other.
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All of the other cases and rules cited by the State are
even more wide of the mark.

For example, Standard Distributors

v. Federal Trade Commission, 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954),
involved a cease-and-desist order directed against a
corporation, which order related to conduct of salesmen engaged
directly by the corporation.

The Restatement Agency 2d § 43(a)

cited by the State at page 17 of its Brief involves
acquiescence.

Acquiescence requires knowledge of that which is

acquiesced in. GAF had none until seven years after the
purported agent had allegedly bound it. Upon learning of
Dr. MacKay's demands, it stood by its written warranty.
It bears noting that even if the power to bind another to
warranties that would have considerable financial impact on the
other were so easily acquired, the State still falls far short
of establishing a deceptive act or indication on GAF's part.
It would require a considerable change in the usual law of
agency to make the question of Pendletonfs power to bind GAF
even a close issue.

That question could have been litigated in

an appropriate civil action between private parties disputing
it, as well as issues of warranty and the like.

The State,

however, would make a deceptive act of GAF's refusal to
acquiesce to the proposition that Pendleton was its agent. The
legislature could never have intended such a result.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

/' 'clay of September, 1984.

PLEFIELD SsPETERSON
426T South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Respondent
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